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THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION IN
GRIEVANCE ADMINISTRATION: A SPECIFIC TEST
MODELED ON JUDGE BAZELON'S DISSENT IN
UNITED STATES V. DECOSTER
The current test for evaluating the adequacy of a union's representa-
tion of an employee in grievance proceedings is imprecise and general.1
In most jurisdictions, the test for evaluating the adequacy of an attor-
ney's representation of a criminal defendant is similarly lacking in
specific descriptive content.' Judge Bazelon, dissenting in United States
v. Decoster, advocated a test that sets forth specific duties to give
courts clear guidance in determining the effectiveness of an attorney's
representation of a criminal defendant.' Incorporating the existing case
law on the union's duty of fair representation into Judge Bazelon's
analytic framework will provide courts and juries clearer guidance in
determining the adequacy of a union's representation of an employee in
grievance proceedings.
The duty of fair representation is a judicially created doctrine
developed to ensure that unions do not abuse the right of exclusive
representation of employees.' Federal labor law establishes the union'
elected by a majority of employees in a bargaining unit6 as the exclusive
representative of all bargaining unit employees in negotiating the terms
1 See text accompanying notes 13-23 infra. The vagueness of the test for evaluating
union representation in grievance proceedings has led to many attempts at clarification. See
generally Feller, A General Theory'of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 663 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Feller]; Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation A
Survey of the Contemporary Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the
Employee, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1096 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Flynn & Higgins]; Leffler,
Piercing the Duty of Fair Representation.. The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and
Grievance Handling 1979 U. OF ILL. L. FOR. 35 [hereinafter cited as Leffler]; Steinhauer,
IBEWv. Foust: A Hint of Negligence in the Duty of Fair Representation, 32 HASTINGS L.J.
1041 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Steinhauer]; Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged
Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CiN. L. REV. 55 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Tobias]; Note, The Duty of Fair Representation: The Emerging Standard of the Union's
Duty in the Context of Negligent Arbitrary or Perfuctory Grievance Administration, 46
Mo. L. REV. 142 (1981).
See text accompanying notes 24-27 infra.
624 F.2d 196, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
See text accompanying note 31 infra.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S.
192, 203 (1944).
6 A bargaining unit is a group of jobs or job classifications, sharing a common interest,
which a union can represent effectively. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw, 66-74
(1976). Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) grants the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) the authority to determine whether the parameters of a particular
bargaining unit are appropriate. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
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of a collective bargaining agreement with an employer.7 Through the col-
lective bargaining agreement, unions can establish themselves as the ex-
clusive representative of employees in contractual grievance proce-
dures, which provide employees with a remedy for an employer's breach
of the collective bargaining agreement.' To avoid the expense of defend-
ing breach of contract suits in court, employers require that the collec-
tive bargaining agreement declare the grievance procedures to be the
employee's exclusive and final remedy.9 Courts will dismiss an
employee's suit if the employee has not attempted to secure a contrac-
tual remedy ° and will defer to the outcome of the grievance proce-
See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
Section 9(a) of the NLRA permits the union to become the exclusive representative
of the employee in grievance proceedings. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). Unions seek the
right to exclusive representation to enhance their prestige among the employees and with
the employer, and to stabilize the meaning of the collective agreement, which operates as
the law of the plant. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965); Cox
Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601, 625-26 (1956). The vast majority of
collective bargaining agreements provide for a grievance procedure with union control. See
E. ELKOURI & F. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS, 7 (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
ELKOURI & ELKOURI]; Flynn & Higgins, supra note 1, at 1105 n.43.
The grievance procedures begin when a employee turns over a grievance slip to the
shop steward, an employee who is also a union official, and the shop steward attempts to
settle the grievance with the plant foreman. See Flynn & Higgins, supra note 1, at 1105 n.4;
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra, at 125. If the shop steward is unsuccessful, a union business
agent, a union professional who generally does not work for the employer, begins present-
ing the grievance to joint grievance committees composed of equal numbers of union and
employer personnel. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 58-59; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra, at
120-21. The grievance committee then attempts resolution or settlement of the grievance.
See id. at 120:21. If the committee does not reach a resolution or settlement, the grievance
is appealed to higher stages of grievance committees composed of higher ranking manage-
ment personnel and members of the national or international union. Id. At the higher levels
of the grievance committees, the shop committeemen from the local union often present the
grievance. See Feller, supra note 1, at 836. If the grievance is not resolved, most collective
agreements provide for final and binding arbitration. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra, at 120.
The arbitrator, a neutral party, may decide the grievance not only on the basis of evidence
presented but also on the basis of arbitration briefs. See id. at 230-32, 252. The cost of ar-
bitration, shared by the union and employer, can vary according to the length of the hearing
and the use of transcripts and briefs. See id., at 22, 218.
Important contractual rights are at stake in the grievance procedures. See Tobias,
supra note 1, at 58. Wages fringe benefits, seniority protection against layoffs, and a retire-
ment pension are some important rights, but the most important is the right to be free from
discharge (the "capital punishment" of labor-management relations) except for just cause.
Id. A discharged employee, who has been with an employer for a significant period, will lose
seniority, chances for promotion, vacation benefits, pension rights, and, in general, economic
-security. Id.
' See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1964; Feller, supra note
1, at 806; Tobias, supra note 1, at 63. Employers consider the grievance procedures as a quid
pro quo for the employees "no-strike clause" in the contract, which provides that employees
will not strike for the duration of the collective agreement. See BNA, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 534-35 (Morris ed. 1971; Feller, supra note 1, at 817.
" See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965) (employee must at-
tempt to exhaust contractual procedures before bringing suit in court). Courts will excuse
an employee's failure to exhaust contractual remedies if the employer repudiates the
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dures." If, however, a union inadequately represents an employee,
courts will permit the employee to sue the union for breach of the duty
of fair representation and then, if successful, the employer for breach of
contract.'2
grievance procedures, if exhausting the procedures would be futile, or if the union has
breached the duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S.
324, 330-31 (1969) (failure to use grievance procedures excused because futile); Drake
Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 524, 262-63, 266-67 (1962)
(employer repudiation of grievance procedures excused exhaustion); Kaylor v. Crown Zeller-
bach, Inc., 643 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1981) (employee does not have to exhaust contractual
remedies if employers conduct amounts to repudiation of collective agreement); Battle v.
Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338, 1344-46 (7th Cir. 1978) (exhaustion of grievance procedures
excused where union would have to prove its own wrong); De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Traba-
jadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 285 (1st Cir.) (breach of the duty of fair representation
excuses employee from exhausting contractual grievance procedures), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
877 (1970). See generally, Flynn & Higgins, supra note 1, at 1140-41; Simpson & Berwick,
Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual Employee, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1179,
1200-13 (1973); Tobias, supra, note 1, at 67-70.
" See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 420 U.S. 554, 563 (1976). Federal labor law
favors the private means of dispute resolution agreed upon by the parties to the collective
agreement. See Labor Management RelationsAct, § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976). Courts
are reluctant to interfere with the private resolution of grievances. See Imel v. Zohn Mfg.
Co., 481 F.2d 181, 183-84 (10th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974). In the
Steelworker's Trilogy, the Supreme Court established a judicial preference for the finality
and jurisdictional scope of arbitration. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960) (judiciary may not usurp function of arbitration by reviewing merits
of dispute); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960)
(doubts as to applicability of arbitration should be resolved in favor of abitration); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) (court affirmed
district court order to employer to comply with arbitration award). See -Note, An Analysis
of a Technique of Dispute Settlement. The Expanding Role of Arbitration, 7 SUFFOLK L.
REV. 618, 624-28 (1973). Courts however will not defer to the finality of abitration if an
employee's federal statutory right, a right not confered by the collective agreement, is at
stake. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 4347 (April 6, 1981)
(minimum wage under Fair Labor Standard Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974) (right to be free from discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964). In addition, courts may vacate an arbitration award if there was fraud, miscon-
duct on the part of the arbitrator, or if the award is against public policy or is based upon a
manifest disregard of the law. Jensen v. Farrell Lines Inc., 477 F. Supp. 335, 348-49
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
" See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). Jurisdiction for an employee suit against the union and employer
rests on the Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), which pro-
vides that suits for violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization
may be brought in any district court of the United States. Although § 301(a) does not refer
to suits brought by individual employees against an employer or a labor organization, the
Supreme Court in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) granted an employee
the right to sue an employer and a union under § 301(a). Id. at 200-01..The Court reasoned
that an individual employee's interests are intertwined with the union's interests and that
individual employee claims precipitate important questions concerning the interpretation
and enforceability of the collective agreement. Id Further, the need for a uniform body of
federal substantive law requires that § 301(a) include individual employee claims. Id. Courts,
however, should look to state law to determine the appropriate statute of limitations and
may use a state law statute of limitations for an action to vacate or modify an arbitration
award. See United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 101 S. Ct. 1559, 1562 (1981).
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If an employee chooses to bring suit only against the union, jurisdiction can be based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976), which grants federal jurisdiction over controversies arising
under a law of the United States regulating commerce. See Mumford v. Glover, 503 F.2d
878, 883 (5th Cir. 1974); Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators Union,
Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1021 n.3 (9th Cir. 1972).
A breach of the duty of fair representation may also constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice, violating § 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). See Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1967), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). In Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Supreme Court assumed, but did not hold, that a breach of
the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice. Id. at 186. Circuit courts,
however, have expressly held that a breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair
labor practice. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d
263, 269 (4th Cir. 1980); Abilene Sheet Metal Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 332, 347 (5th Cir. 1980);
NLRB v. American Postal Workers Union, 618 F.2d 1249, 1254-55 (8th Cir. 1980); Kesner v.
NLRB, 532 F.2d 1162, 1173-74 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 883 (1976). The NLRB does
not have exclusive jurisdiction over an unfair representation suit, see Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 186-87, and the
primary responsibility for defining the duty of fair representation rests with the courts. See
Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1245 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 116 (1980).
An employee might prefer to bring an unfair representation suit in court rather than
an unfair labor practice complaint with the NLRB, because the NLRB will only award back
pay and not lost future wages. See Flynn & Higgins, supra note 1, at 1139. Also, the Board
can assess damages only against the union and not against the employer. Id. An employee
also may find that the General Counsel of the NLRB will not file a complaint with the
NLRB, and the decision is unreviewable. See Flynn & Higgins, supra note 1, at 1139.
The remedies available to an employee in an unfair representation suit in court are
reinstatement or lost future earnings if reinstatement is not feasible, back pay, and at-
torney's fees. See Comment, Apportionment of Damages in DFR/Contract Suits: Who Pays
for the Union's Breach, 1981 WIs. L. REV. 155, 162-63 [hereinafter cited as Apportionment of
Damages]. In International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), the
Supreme Court ruled that awarding punitive damages against a union is inappropriate. Id.
at 48-52. The Court reasoned that federal labor law is remedial in purpose, that high jury
awards might undermine union financial stability, and that fear of large damages might
undermine union discretion in handling grievances. Id. Four Justices concurring, however,
rejected a per se prohibition of punitive damages and would allow punitive damages in in-
stances of personal animus or racial discrimination. Id. at 60 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Courts disagree on the method of apportioning damages. See Apportionment of
Damages, supra, at 166-83; see generally Linsey, The Apportionment of Liability for
Damages Between Employer and Union in § 301 Actions Involving a Union's Breach of Its
Duty of Fair Representation, 30 MERCER L. REv. 661 (1979). Under one approach, unless the
union participated in the wrongful discharge, the union cannot be held liable for lost earn-
ings. See, e.g., Milstead v. Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1978); Richard-
son v. Communication Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 981 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1971);
De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 289 (1st Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Apportionment of Damages, supra, at 167-70. Under the se-
cond approach, the union is liable for lost earnings accruing only after the unfair hearing, a
hearing that the employer relied upon as valid and binding. See, e.g., Foust v. IBEW, 572
F.2d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Battle v. Clark
Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1978); Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d
558, 562-63 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976); Apportionment of Damages,
supra, at 170-75. Even if the employer did not breach the contract, the employee can recover
attorney's fees, which constitute the expense of seeking a second hearing that is fair. See
Milstead v. Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1978); Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land




In Vaca v. Sipes, '13 the Supreme Court established the test for
evaluating union compliance with the duty of fair representation.14 In
Vaca, the Supreme Court held that a breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation occurs when union conduct is "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad
faith." 5 Although the Court indicated that a union cannot ignore or per-
functorily process a meritorious grievance,"6 the Court did not clearly
define the scope of the standard. Relying on dictum in a Supreme Court
case subsequent to Vaca,17 some courts initially viewed the standard as
requiring proof of a mental element of bad faith to establish a breach of
'" 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
" See id. at 190.
,1 Id. The duty of fair representation first arose in the context of union representation
in bargaining for job benefits. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In
Steele the union, having excluded black employees from union membership, negotiated a con-
tract that gave preference to white employees in gaining seniority. Id. at 194-96. The court
held that accompanying the right to exclusive representation was the duty of treating all
employees "without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." Id at 204.
The Steele court held that distinctions based on skill, seniority and type of work performed
are permissible, but that distinctions based on race are irrelevant and invidious. Id. at 203.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the Supreme Court did not find a breach
of the duty of fair representation when theunion gave preference in negotiating a contract
to employees that had served in World War H. See id. at 334-35, 342-43. The court held that
complete satisfaction of every employee subgroup was impossible. Id at 338. The Ford
Motor Co. Court further stated that in order to accommodate conflicting interests in con-
tract negotiation, unions need a wide range of reasonableness in balancing employee
demands. Id. The Court cautioned, however, that the union's discretion is subject to good
faith and honesty of purpose. Id. The Supreme Court first examined the duty of fair
representation in the context of grievance processing in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335
(1964). In Humphrey, the union decided to dovetail the seniority rights of two merging
plants. Id at 339. In the grievance proceedings the union sided against a group of employees
whose seniority rights the decision to dovetail jeopardized. See id. A state court had enjoined
the union from taking sides in the dispute against the interests of the group of employees.
Id- at 341. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the union had acted upon "wholly rele-
vant considerations, not upon capricious or arbitrary factors." Id. at 350. In Vaca v. Sipes,
the court drew together the various elements in Steele, Humphrey, and Ford Motor Co. and
defined the duty of fair representation in terms of conduct that is "arbitrary, discriminatory
or in bad faith:' 386 U.S. at 190. See generally Leffler, supra note 1, at 37-47.
" 386 U.S. at 191.
7 See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,298 (1971).-InLockridge, the
Supreme Court stated that to prevail in an unfair representation suit, an employee would
have to adduce "substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct." Id. at
299, (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)). The Lockridge Court seemed to
construe a mere rejection of a plaintiff's allegation of fraud in Humphrey as the standard for
determining whether a union has breached the duty of fair representation. See 403 U.S. at
299. The Court also declared that for an employee to prevail there must be evidence of
"discrimination that is intentional, severe and unrelated to legitimate union objectives." Id.
at 301. As one commentator has pointed out, the language in Lockridge regarding fraud,
deceitful action and dishonest conduct can serve as a definition of bad faith. See Leffler,
supra note 1, at 44-45. The term "bad faith" cannot be defined with precision, but is con-
notes an intentional and dishonest failure to protect the employee's rights out of an in-
terested or an improper motive. See Mitchell v. Hercules Inc., 410 F. Supp. 560, 568 (S.D.
Ga. 1976); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127 (5th ed. 1979).
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duty.18 The circuits gradually, however, have reached agreement that ar-
bitrary conduct, without bad faith, can be a breach of the duty of fair
representation. 9 Courts have defined the term "arbitrary" to mean
unreasonable, holding that a union may not pursue an unreasonable
course of conduct2 or make an unreasonable decision2' in handling a
grievance. Absent bad faith or discrimination, which are more difficult
to prove than arbitrariness,22 courts and juries rely for guidance on the
vague concept of arbitrariness in evaluating the adequacy of union
representation.'
, See, e.g., Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957, 961 (1980); Anderson v. United
Transp. Union, 557 F.2d 165, 168 (8th Cir. 1977); Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,
524 F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1975); Augspurger v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510 F.2d
853, 859 (8th Cir. 1975); Dente v. Masters Local 90, 492 F.2d 10, 12 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974); Reid v. UAW Dist. Lodge 1093, 479 F.2d 517, 520 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973); Bruno v. Steelworkers Local 3571, 456 F. Supp. 425, 428
(D. Conn. 1978). One court has recognized that in the context of bargaining for job benefits,
where a union needs discretion to adjust conflicting interests, see note 15 supra, a union
should be held liable only for bad faith conduct, but in the context of grievance administra-
tion, negligence should suffice to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. See
Brown v. International Union, UAW, 512 F. Supp. 1337, 1358 n.29, 1359-60 (W.D. Mich 1981).
19 See, e.g., Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1209, 1211 n.3 (6th Cir.
1981); Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958 (3d Cir. 1981); Wyatt v. Interstate
& Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891 (4th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co.,
619 F.2d 1229, 1237 (8th Cir. 1980); Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 277 n.11 (7th
Cir. 1980); Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1125 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 104 (1980); Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes and Checkers of IL&WU,
501 F.2d 258, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1974); Jones v. TWA, 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1974); Griffin v.
International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972); De Arroyo v. Sindicato De
Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.).
2 See, e.g., Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1237, 1239 (8th Cir.
1980) (union conduct exceed permissible range of reasonableness); King v. Space Carriers,
Inc., 608 F.2d 283, 287 (8th Cir. 1979) (union action reasonable); Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710,
715 (10th Cir. 1978) (arbitrary conduct is conduct not done according to reason and judg-
ment); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1977) (court con-
sidered reasonableness of union's action); Griffin v. International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d
181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972) (union may not pursue course of conduct that is unreasonable);
Sarnelli v. Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, Local 33, 457 F.2d 807, 808 (1st Cir. 1972)
(union action may not be unreasonable); Kowalski v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l
Harvester Co., 433 F. Supp. 314, 316-17 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (union pursued reasonable course of
action and was not arbitrary).
21 See, e.g., Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1211 n.3 (6th Cir. 1981) (ar-
bitrary decision one without reason); Kaylor v. Crown Zellerback, Inc., 643 F.2d 1362, 1369
(9th Cir. 1981) (union decision reasonable and not arbitrary); Smith v. Hussmann
Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1243 (8th Cir. 1980) (jury could have viewed union decision
as unreasonable); Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1128 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 104 (1981) (union decision not unreasonable); Griffin v. International
Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972) (union must have reason for making decision).
Bad faith and discrimination require proof of a subjective intent, but arbitrariness is
an objective standard and requires no proof of scienter. See Leffler, supra note 1, at 43;
Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 277 n.11 (7th Cir. 1980).
See, e.g., Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710, 714 (10th Cir. 1978) (court defined arbitrary
to jury as unreasonable or capricious); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d
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Most jurisdictions employ a general concept of reasonableness in the
test for evaluating an attorney's compliance with the Sixth Amend-
ment" guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel2 to a criminal
defendant.28 Formulations of the test require an attorney to comply with
some variation of the standard of "reasonably competent assistance of
counsel."'  In United States v. Decoster,8 however, Judge Bazelon
dissented to the formulation of a general reasonableness standard.29
Judge Bazelon recognized that the phrase "reasonably effective assist-
ance of counsel" is merely a shorthand phrase for a specific set of duties
that counsel owes to a criminal defendant."0 Judge Bazelon accordingly
outlined a specific checklist of duties for courts to use in examining
counsel's performance:
... (1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and as
often as necessary to elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain
that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel should discuss
fully potential strategies and tactical choices with his client. (2)
Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and take
all actions necessary to preserve them ... (3) Counsel must con-
442, 453 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975) (lower court did not have to define term
arbitrary to jury). An employee has a right to a jury trial in an unfair representation suit.
See Cox v. C. H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138, 143 (5th Cir. 1979).
2, U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense." Id.
I In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the Supreme Court indicated that the
right to have the assistance of counsel means the right to have the effective assistance of
counsel. 397 U.S. at 771. The Court held that counsel's advice must fall within the "range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.. ." Id.
I See, Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (reasonably
competent attorney acting as diligent conscientious advocate), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980
(1979); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 887 (5th Cir. 1978) (reasonably effective
assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1979); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540,
543 (4th Cir. 1977) (representation within range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases, cert denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); United.States v. Malone, 558 F.2d 435, 438
(8th Cir. 1977) (counsel must exercise customary skills and diligence that reasonably compe-
tent attorney would exercise under similar circumstances); United States v. Sielaff, 542 F.2d
377, 379 (7th Cir.) (counsel must meet minimum standard of professional representation);
United States v. Toney, 527 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1975) (attorney reasonably likely to
render and rendering reasonably effective assistance, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976).
Other circuits require that counsel's dereliction shock the conscience of the.court and make
the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice before reversing a conviction. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ramiriz, 535 F.2d 125, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Larsen, 525
F.2d 444, 449 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1075 (1976); United States v. Yanishef-
sky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
' See note 26 supra.
2 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
See id. at 264 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
0 See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973)..
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duct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to deter-
mine what matters of defense can be developed.... The investi-
gation should always include efforts to secure information in the
possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities.
And, of course, the duty to investigate also requires adequate
legal research."'
Every slight deviation from the checklist would not amount to an
automatic constitutional violation; rather, a criminal defendant would
have to prove that a deviation was substantial. 2 Further, the duties
were not to be inflexible, and a showing of a substantial violation would
prompt a judicial inquiry into whether the deviation was justifiable or
excusable under the circumstances.'
The specific duties Judge Bazelon enumerated suggest a similar
checklist of duties that could define the union's duty of fair representa-
tion. The specific union duties would include the basic procedural step of
timely filing the grievance,3' making investigations into both the
underlying facts and the contractual provisions that apply to those
facts, 5 appraising the grievance honestly and reasonably,38 informing the
employee of rights and of union actions that affect those rights,'
attempting settlement,38 and presenting the basic issues of fact and
every known defense in formal hearings. 9 These duties would not be
ironclad or inflexible, and even if the employee were to establish inade-
quate performance or nonperformance of a duty, courts then could per-
mit the union to justify or excuse the deviation." Existing case law on
the duty of fair representation readily fits into this analytic framework
for determining whether a union has breached the duty of fair represen-
tation.
Courts have found a failure to file a grievance timely to be a breach
of the duty of fair representation."' To promote quick settlement of
11 See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 276 n.63 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting) (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (App. Draft 1971)).
See 624 F.2d at 281.
See id. at 282.
See text accompanying notes 41-45 infra.
See text accompanying notes 46-52 infra,
See text accompanying notes 53-62 infra.
See text accompanying notes 71-80 infra.
See text accompanying notes 81-84 infra.
See text accompanying notes 85-90 infra.
o See text accompanying notes 102-110 infra.
4, See Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710, 715-16 (10th Cir. 1978),; Ruzicka v. General Motors
Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir.), rehearing denied, 528 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd and
remanded, 649 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1981); Schum v. South Buffalo Ry., 496 F.2d 328,331-32 (2d
Cir. 1974); Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 511 F. Supp. 719, 726-28 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Baker v. Unit Parts Co., 487 F. Supp. 1313, 1315-16 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Ruggirello v. Ford
Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 759-60 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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grievances, the employer and the union impose time limits on filing a
grievance or on filing an appeal of the outcome of a particular step in the
grievance procedure.'2 Due to the union's status as exclusive represen-
tative of the employee, the union, and not the employee, must ensure
that the grievance is filed timely.'3 If the union fails to file within the
contractual deadline, the employer is not obligated to honor the
grievance." Since a failure to file timely can deprive an employee of an
opportunity for a contractual remedy, at least one court has described
the duty to file timely as a weighty obligation. 5
The duty to investigate is an important element of fair representa-
tion.48 Courts have held that a union representative should pursue poten-
tial witnesses,'7 secure relevant documents 8 and obtain necessary ex-
pert assistance in order to understand a complex issue.49 Additionally,
the union representative should inquire into mitigating factors that
might lead to settlement with the employer, such as a favorable work
record, length of service, or past employer lenience. Not only must the
'z See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 8, at 146-54.
' See Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 511 F. Supp. 719, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
" See id.; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 8, at 148-49.
See Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 511 F. Supp. 719, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
" See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 558-60 (1976); Smith v.
Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1240 (8th Cir. 1980); Miller v. Gateway Transp.
Co., 616 F.2d 272, 277(7th Cir. 1980); Lowe v. Pate Stevedoring Co., 558 F.2d 769, 770 n.2
(5th Cir. 1977); De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st
Cir. 1970). In Hines, the Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of a union
that had failed to investigate an employee's grievance. 424 U.S. at 561. The employer dis-
charged the employees for falsifying motel receipts. Id. at 557-58. Had the union representa-
tive made inquiry at the motel, as the employees suggested, he might have discovered that
a motel clerk in fact was responsible. Id. In Smith, the Eighth Circuit held that the union
should have investigated the actual skill of certain employees, when skill was at issue in a
promotion dispute. See 619 F.2d at 1240. In Miller, the employer discharged an employee
for refusing to drive a truck, which the employee believed to be over the legal height limit.
616 F.2d at 274. The Seventh Circuit held that the union should have investigated more fully
to determine if the employee was correct. See id at 277. In Lowe, the Fifth Circuit held that
a union should have investigated an employee's discharge when issues of fact existed in the
case. 558 F.2d at 770 n.2, 773. In De Arroyo, the First Circuit upheld a jury's findng that a
union was arbitrary for failing to investigate the nature of the employee's grievance. 425-
F.2d at 284. The union incorrectly assumed that an NLRB proceeding already in progress
would protect the employee's interests. Id. See also Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d
1123, 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 104 (1980) (court recognized that investigation is
necessary for fair representation); Cox v. C. H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138, 145 (5th
Cir. 1979) (court considered investigation as evidence of compliance with duty of fair
representation); Turner v. Air Transp. Dispatchers Ass'n, 468 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1972)
(union discretion in handling grievance restricted by duty to investigate).
" See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 558-61, 571 (1976); Miller v.
Gateway Trabsp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 1980).
See Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 1980).
"See Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 486 F. Supp. 966, 970-71 (E.D. Ark.), rev'd on
other grounds, 648 F.2d 492 (1980).
1 See Tobias, supra note 1, at 57.
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union representative investigate facts, but the representative must also
examine the collective bargaining agreement, which functions as the law
of the plant." The representative also should be aware of any past prac-
tice, custom or construction that has modified the meaning of the con-
tractual provisions."
Courts have held that a union must honestly and reasonably ap-
praise the merits of an employee's grievance. 3 A union must appraise
the merits of a grievance because a union is not obligated to arbitrate if
a grievance lacks merit." If a union had to arbitrate every grievance, no
matter how frivolous, the constractual procedures would become clog-
ged and prohibitively expensive. 5 Although the Supreme Court has not
indicated that a union may base a decision to abandon a grievance on fac-
tors other than the grievance's actual merit, lower courts have permit-
ted a union to abandon a grievance based upon other factors such as the
grievance's chance of success,56 the strain on the union treasury,57 or the
threat of creating discord with an employer. Courts reason that the
union represents all employees, and must often accommodate conflicting
interests to the disadvantage of an individual employee.59 Under this ra-
tionale, courts also have indicated that a union may refuse to advance a
grievance to arbitration for fear that an arbitrator's interpretation of an
" See Milstead v. Teamsters, Local 957, 580 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1978).
See Cronin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 588 F.2d 616, 618 (8th Cir. 1978) (court
favorably viewed union representatives efforts at investigating modifications in meaning of
contract).
I See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192-93, 194 (1961); Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator
Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1240 (8th Cir.); Melendy v. United States Postal Serv., 589 F.2d 256, 259
(7th Cir. 1978); Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145, 151 (7th Cir. 1978).
See note 53 supra.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-92 (1967).
See Cox v. C. H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138, 145 (5th Cir. 1979); Cicirelli v.
Lear Siegler Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Encina v. Tony Lama Co., 316 F.
Supp. 239, 245 (W.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1971).
1 See Cox v. C. H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138,m 145 (5th Cir. 1979); Curth v.
Faraday, Inc. 401 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Encina v. Tony Lama Co., 316 F. Supp.
239, 245 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
11 See Buchanan v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 1979) (union can abandon
grievance if pursuit of grievance would create discord with employer); Stevens v.
Teamsters Local 2707, 504 F. Supp. 332, 336 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (union can consider harm to
bargaining position in deciding on course of action).
"' See International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979) (union
must represent interests of all employees); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967) (settle-
ment of grievances allows union to protect meaning of collective agreement in representing
interests of all employees); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342, 349-50 (1964) (union can
take sides in conflict among different groups to prevent weakening of bargaining and
grievance process); Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1235, 1237-38 (8th
Cir. 1980) (union may favor collective interests and act against employee only on basis of
reasoned and informed judgment); Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 959 (5th Cir.




ambiguity in the contract will adversely affect the interest of other
employees."0 Nevertheless, a union may not fail to protect unambi-
guously vested rights even for the benefit of other employees, 1 and a
union may not trade a possibly meritorious claim for a concession from
an employer.2
To avoid discouraging a union from deciding against arbitration of a
meritless grievance, courts emphasize that in making the decision
whether or not to process to arbitration, a union has discretion. 3 A
See Milstead v. Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1978).
e, See, e.g., Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1238 (8th Cir. 1980)
(union has fiduciary duty to protect vested rights); Emmanuel v. Omaha Carpenters Dist.
Council, 560 F.2d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1977) (union cannot ignore vested rights even for
legitimate purpose); Butler v. Local 823, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442,451-54
(8th Cir.) (union may not ignore contract rights plainly vested in favor of employee), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975). But see Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 111-12 (5th
Cir. 1973) (union and employer may abrogate vested rights by modifying meaning of contract
through custom and practice).
"2 See, e.g., Emmanuel v. Omaha Carpenters Dist. Coundil, 535 F.2d 420, 423-24 (8th
Cir. 1976) (union cannot trade vested rights for concession from employer); Harrison v.
United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 561 (4th Cir. 1975) (jury could find breach in union's
trading employee's grievance to favorably settle the grievance of another employee), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976), Local 13, IL&WU v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n., 441 F.2d 1061, 1067
(9th Cir. 1971) (union may not trade a grievance in exchange for concession from employer
unless there is attempt to resolve ambiguity in contract), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
" See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). In Vaca, the Supreme Court followed the
position of professor Archibald Cox that courts should accord unions discretion and control
in the processing of grievances. See 386 U.S. at 190-91; see also, Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 625-26 (1956). Cox argued that union control is necessary
for the union to deal with unforeseen problems in the collective agreement, to stabilize the
meaning of the collective agreement determined in arbitration, and to prevent union rivalry
relating to the processing grievances. See id. at 625-26. Compare Summers, Individual
Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 362, 381-88 (1962)
(employee should have absolute right to arbitration, but should pay for arbitrating seemingly
meritless claim, to be reimbursed if successful).
The concept of union discretion in representing an employee first arose in the context
of bargaining for job benefits. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). In
Ford Motor Co., the Supreme Court held that a union needs a wide range of reasonableness
in accommodating the conflicting interests of employee subgroups, each damanding more
from the employer. Id. If a union had to justify the reasonableness of decisions made in
negotiations, union flexibility necessary to strike an agreement would be severely
hampered. See Hayden v. RCA Global Commun., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
Because the distinction between the duty of fair representation in the context of bargaining
and in the context of grievance administration has not been clear, some courts have treated
a union's discretion in the context of grievance administration as if equally wide as in the
context of bargaining. See NLRB v. PPG Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1978)
(wide discretion). At least one court, however, has recognized the distinction -between
representation in bargaining and in grievance administration, and has stated that the need
for discretion in grievance administration may not be as great as in bargaining. See Brown
v. International Union, UAW; 512 F. Supp. 1337, 1355-60 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
To the extent that some grievances, such as seniority disputes, require accommodation
of conflicting interests among employees, a union still needs wide discretion in resolving the
inevitable conflict. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 338 (1964). Some grievances,
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jury's later belief that reasonable men would have done otherwise or
that the grievance was in fact valid will not prove that the union acted
dishonestly or unreasonably in deciding not to arbitrate."4 Yet, courts do
review a union's decision not to arbitrate a grievance,65 and at least one
court has stated that the apparent validity of the claim can be circum-
stantial evidence of a union's breach of the duty of fair representation.
6
1
Furthermore, courts have held that a union may not act without a reason
in taking an action, 7 and in the context of deciding to arbitrate a
grievance, one court has indicated that the reason not to arbitrate
should be sound.8 One court has held that once a union has admitted to
an employee that a grievance has merit, a union may not abandon that
grievance."9
Case law suggests that a union should be under a general duty to in-
form the employee of contractual rights and of union actions that affect
those rights." Several courts have held a union liable for failing to in-
form an employee of a union decision not to arbitrate a grievance."' The
however, directly affect the interests of only an individual employee, and the individual's in-
terests should weigh more heavily in a union decision whether to arbitrate. At least one
court and one commentator have suggested that in a discharge case, the most critical of
grievances, a union should have less freedom to sacrifice the individual for the good of the
group. See Griffin v. International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972) (union
must especially avoid arbitrary conduct in discharge case); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for
Critical Job Interest. Union Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13
RUTGERS L. REv. 631, 646-47 (1959); Tobias, supra note 1, at 58-62.
" See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192-93 (1967); Baldini v. Local 1095, International
Union, UAW, 581 F.2d 145, 151 (7th Cir. 1978).
" See Janow v. Schweitzer Div. of Kimberly-Clark, 503 F. Supp. 973, 979 (D. N.J.
1980).
, Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558,561 (4th Cir. 1975) (proof of grievance's
merit is circumstantial evidence of breach of duty of fair representation), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
958 (1976); Robesky v. Quantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082,1089 (9th Cir. 1978) (some
circumstances may indicate that union's reasons are too insubstantial to support its action)
(quoting Clark, THE DUTY OF FAIr REPRESENTATION: A THEORETICAL STRUCTURE, 51 TEx. L.
REV. 1119, 1131, 1139 (1973)). But see Freeman v. O'Neal Steel Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1126 (1980)
(court's view of grievance's probability of success cannot be basis for finding breach of duty of
fair representation).
See Griffin v. International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972).
See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1981) (union must
articulate sufficient rationale, must have a sound reason for not processing grievance to ar-
bitration).
" See Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 141 F. Supp. 758, 760 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
70 See text accompanying notes 72-80 infra.
7 See, e.g., Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1088-91 (9th Cir.
1978) (employee rejected employer's settlement because ignorant of decision to abandon
grievance); Willetts v. Ford Motor Co., 583 F.2d 852, 855 (6th Cir. 1978) (union failed to in-
form employee of status of grievance); Minnis v. International Union, UAW, 531 F.2d 850,
854 (8th Cir. 1975) (union waited six months before informing employee that union decided
not to take grievance to arbitration); Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 562-62
(4th Cir. 1975) (union did not notify employee that union had dropped grievance); Pratt v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 508, 509, 513 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (failure to notify employee
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rationale is not clear, but an employee, relying on a false hope of vindica-
tion in the grievance procedures, might delay looking for another job or
might refuse an employer's settlement offer.7 2 Since the union, in ap-
praising the employee's claim, acts as a judge and not as a advocate of
the employee, the employee justifiably should want to know the reasons
for the union's decision to abandon the grievance. If the reasons are
specious or insubstantial, the employee then can seek relief in court by
suing the union." In addition to requiring the union to inform the
employee of a decision not to arbitrate, courts have indicated that a
union should inform an employee of the contractual right to file a
grievance,7 4 of hearings where the employee's testimony might be impor-
tant in protecting his interests," and in general of any union action that
may adversely affect the employee.78 Yet, courts have not required a
union to inform an employee union member of rights under the union
constitution to an intraunion appeal of a union decision not to process a
of abandoned grievance resulted in forfeiture of right to bring action with NLRB); Day v.
UAW Local 36, 466 F.2d 83, 98 (6th Cir. 1972) (union withdrew grievance without notice to
employee or opportunity to be heard on matter); Stevens v. Teamsters Local 2707, 504 F.
Supp. 332, 336 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (union should have informed employee that union had
dropped grievance because employee could have processed grievance personally by terms
of collective agreement). But see Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir.
1970) (failure to inform employee that union had decided not to process grievance is not
breach of duty, especially when failure does not prejudice employee); Welch v. Mason &
Dixon Lines, 507 F. Supp. 1069, 1071 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (failure to inform employee of status
of grievance does not support claim of unfair representation).
I See Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 1978)
(employee declined settlement offer).
71 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
," See Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 617 F.2d 1321, 1331 (9th Cir.) (union must ex-
plain to employees rights and duties under contract), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1980);
Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel and Elevator Operators Union, Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018,
1023-24 (9th Cir. 1972) (union failure to inform Spanish speaking maids of right to file
grievance status cause of action for breach of duty of fair representation).
7I See Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229,1241 (8th Cir. 1980) (jury could
consider failure to notify employee to hearing where personal testimony. important to be
breach); Bond v. Local Union 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 521- F.2d 5, 9 (8th Cir. 1975) (not
giving employee notice of hearing or opportunity to attend hearing that may affect his
rights can be breach). See also Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S..335, 350-51 (1964). In Hum-
phrey, the Supreme Court held that when an employee had notice of a hearing and cannot
indicate what matters of defense the representatives omitted, then the employee cannot
successfully attack the fairness of the hearing. Id. Accord, Crusco v. Fisher &-Bro., 458 F.
Supp. 413, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
," See American Postal Workers Union, 618 F.2d 1249, 1255 (8th Cir. 1980); Robesky v.
Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 1978). In American Postal
Workers Union, the union was held liable for unilaterally revoking an employee's shift
change without communicating with the employee. 618 F.2d at 1253, 1256-57. In Robesky,
the union decided not to take the grievance to arbitration, without informing the employee.
573 F.2d at 1088. The employee in Robesky might have accepted an employer's settlement
offer if she had known of the union's decision to drop the grievance. Id. at 1089. Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded a judgment in favor of the union on the issue of
breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 1091.
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grievance." Courts reason that an employee who enters the contract of
union membership has the responsibility of knowing the terms of that
contract, the union constitution, which describes the right to an intra-
union appeal. 8 One court, however, has recognized the possible merit in
requiring unions to inform employees of the right to an intraunion ap-
peal since the employee often may be incapable of understanding the
constitution's complex and technical language."
Only one court has expressly stated that a union must attempt set-
tlement of an employee's grievance," but several courts have viewed
favorably a union's efforts at processing the grievance through joint
grievance committees, where the union and employer representatives
attempt settlement after hearing the merits of an employee's claim.
See, e.g., Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1980);
Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1974); Pawlak v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 444 F. Supp. 807, 811 (M.D. Pa.), affd, 571 F.2d 572 (1977). But see Cam-
marata v. Ice Cream Drivers, Local 757, 441 F. Supp. 696, 701 (E.D. N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 591
F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 1978) (if efficacy and availability of intraunion appeal is unclear, union
should show that procedures are generally known to membership).
Informing the employee of the right to an intraunion appeal can be of consequence
because courts may dismiss an employee's suit if the employee has not attempted to ex-
haust intraunion remedies. See Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 101 S. Ct. 2088, 2095
(1981). See generally Fox and Sorenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of Intraunion Appeals:
A Misbegotten Marriage, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 989 (1980); Comment, The Exhaustion of Inter-
nal Union Remedies as a Prerequisite to Section 301 Actions Against Labor unions and
Employers, 1979 CHI-KENT L. REV. 259; Note, Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies as a
Prerequisite to Section 301 Actions Against Employers, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111
(1979).
Courts require a union member employee to exhaust intraunion appeals because the
union member is contractually obligated to comply with the union constitution and bylaws
that require such exhaustion. See Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 800-801
(7th Cir. 1972). Courts have discretion in determining whether to require that an employee
exhaust intraunion remedies. See Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 101 S. Ct. 2088,
2095 (1981). Three factors should be relevant to the exercise of a court's discretion: first,
whether the union officials were so hostile to the employee that he could not hope to receive
a fair hearing; second, whether the internal union appeals procedures would be
inadequate in reactivating the claim or providing the full relief that the employee might ob-
tain under a § 301 suit; third, whether exhaustion of the internal union remedies would
unreasonably delay the employee's opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing of the dispute.
Id. An employer can assert the defense of failure to exhaust intraunion remedies if use of
the remedies could have resulted in a reactivation of the grievance, so that the employee's
claim against the employer would have been resolved by the grievance procedure. See id. at
2093.
78 See Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 1974).
7 See Savel v. Detroit News, 435 F. Supp. 329, 333 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
o See Cammarata v. Ice Cream Drivers, Local 757, 441 F. Supp. 696, 701 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (employees have right to have grievances presented for possible settlement).
8, See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967) (efforts at processing grievance
through joint grievance committees showed compliance with duty of fair representation);
Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1128 (5th Cir. 1980) (processing of grievance
through third step of grievance procedures indicated compliance with duty); Cox v. C. H.
Masland & Sons, 607 F.2d 138, 145 (5th Cir. 1979) (processing grievance through joint com-
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Moreover, one court has held the union liable for depriving an employee
of an opportunity to settle a grievance, which the union in fact had taken
to arbitration.2 While a union may have many reasons for refusing to
take grievance to arbitration, the union has a less compelling need to be
able to refuse even minimal attempts at settling a grievance, even if the
grievance is somewhat weak. Processing a grievance through joint
grievance committees does not entail the expense of arbitration, and
does not lead to discord, but to discussion and to cooperation with an
employer. 3 The Supreme Court has implied that for a union to fail to
process a grievance at all, the grievance must be wholly frivolous.
84 To
deny an employee even a chance of obtaining a settlement of the grie-
vance, the union should have a strong basis for believing that the
grievance is entirely without merit.
Courts have suggested that the union should be under an obligation
in formal hearings to present the basic issues of fact of a grievance and
every known defense that is available.85 In presenting the issues of fact
mittee hearings and offer of settlement showed compliance with duty); Cicirelli v. Lear
Siegler, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (processing grievance up to stage 41/2
and obtaining settlement showed compliance with duty); Kowaiski v. Wisconsin Steel Works
of Int'l Harvester Co., 433 F. Supp. 314, 317 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (processing grievance to fourth
step of procedures and efforts at settlement showed compliance with duty).
See Griffin v. International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181,183 (4th Cir. 1972). In Griffin,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's judgment against a union for attempting
resolution of the grievance with a supervisor with whom the employee had fought. Id. at
184-85. The fight was the reason for the discharge. Id. at 184. Had the union presented the
grievance to a more objective supervisor, the grievance might have been settled. Id. at 185.
" See, Stevens v. Teamsters Local 2707, 504 F. Supp. 332, 335 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (at
higher levels, processing grievances becomes increasingly expensive); note 8 supra.
See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964). In Humphrey, the Supreme Court
held that a union may take sides on questionably meritorious grievances to the same extent
that it can sift out from the grievance procedures a wholly frivolous grievance. See id. The
Court in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), did not address the question of when a union may
refuse to process a grievance at all, because in Vaca the union had processed the grievance
up to the last stage before arbitration and had made a settlement offer to the employer. See
id. at 193-94.
' See Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 961 (3d Cir. 1981) (union must pre-
sent basic issues of fact in understandable fashion); Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d
272, 277 (7th Cir. 1980) (union could be held liable for failing to raise the defense of the
absence of a warning letter, a prerequisite to discharge of employee); Donahue v. L.C.L.
Transit Co., 492 F. Supp. 288, 292-93 (W.D. Wis. 1980) (failure to raise available defensd can
be breach of duty of fair representation unless union makes reasonable decision not to raise
defense); Crusco v. Fisher & Bro., 458 F. Supp. 413, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (employee must
show that representative omitted evidence or legal theory to show breach). But see Cannon
v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1975) (failure to raise a
defense mere negligence and not a breach of duty); Jensen v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 477 F.
Supp. 335, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (failure of union to raise argument merely negligence and not
a breach of duty), rev'd on other grounds, 625 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
1359 (1981); Bruno v. United Steelworkers Local 3571, 456 F. Supp. 425, 428 (D. Conn.
1978) (court found no breach when representative failed to rasie issue of more lenient treat-
ment of other employees since failure not intentional).
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and the defenses, however, the union representative need not possess a
lawyer's sensitivity to subtle nuances in the presentation of evidence.,
However, the union representative may not ignore obvious sources of
proof8 In presenting grievances, union representatives have fallen
below the requirement of presenting the basic issues of fact and every
known defense. For example, union representatives, breaching the duty
of fair representation, have openly admitted arbitration that a grievance
is without merit,88 have conceded that a vague and overbroad rule which
the company had no right to promulgate was reasonable, 9 and have failed
to present the merits of a complex medical issue by presenting it as if a
routine claim. By imposing the specific obligation on the union of
presenting the basic issues of fact and every known defense, the ade-
quacy of a union's presentation will be easily verifiable. Furthermore,
compliance with these obligations will ensure a relatively full and fair
hearing of the employee's claim.
Even if courts were to adopt a specific checklist of duties modelled
on Judge Bazelon's analytic framework, courts still would have to define
some minimum level of performance below which a union's efforts may
not fall. A total failure to act, obviously, is inadequate representation.'
Yet, a union does not have to exhaust every resource to satisfy completely
an aggrieved employee.2 The Supreme Court's indication that a union
may not perfunctorily process a grievance, 93 could define the union's
minimum level of competence. Perfunctory performance is superficial or
cursory performance that derives from a lack of enthusiasm or concern."'
One court has emphasized the subjective aspect of the word perfunctory,
refusing to find perfunctoriness because the union representative,
" See Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 961 (3d Cir. 1981); Walden v. Local
71, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 468 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1972).
See Tatum v. Frisco Transp. Co., 626 F.2d 55, 59 (8th Cir. 1980).
See Kesner v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir.) (union representative admitted
in a hearing that grievance was without merit), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983 (1976). See also
NLRB v. P.P.B. Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1978) (if union decides to process
grievance it must advocate employee's position).
89 See Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191, 200 (D. Conn. 1974), modified on other
grounds, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
9 See Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 486 F. Supp. 966, 970-71, 983 (E.D. Ark. 1980)
(representative lacked assistance of an expert and failed to present merits of a defense due
to lack of insight), rev'd on other grounds, 648 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1981).
91 See Minnis v. International Union, UAW, 531 F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 1975) (utter
failure to investigate is breach of duty).
92 See Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1125 (5th Cir. 1980) (union does not
have to perform ministerial duty of satisfying each employee demand at all costs).
" Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
" See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 76 (unabridg. ed.
1966) (perfunctory conduct hasty, superficial, cursory, mechanical and lacking in interest or
enthusiasm). See also Mitchel v. Hercules Inc., 410 F. Supp. 560, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (perfunc-




though at fault for failing to file a grievance, was enthusiastic and
zealous in fact. Other courts have identified perfunctory conduct with a
level of performance independent of a representative's subjective feel-
ings." Inept, incompetent or superficial performance thus will establish
inadequate representation. 7 Since the Supreme Court has indicated that
fair representation turns on the manner of representation,9 and that a
union's representation should fall within a range of acceptable perform-
ance,99 courts should accordingly employ an objective rather than a sub-
jective definition of the term "perfunctory". The Supreme Court has
stated that a minimum level of integrity should be maintained in the
grievance procedures,' 9 and by defining that minimum level in terms of
performance that is more than superficial or cursory, courts will provide
an understandable definition. If a union's efforts are more than super-
ficial and cursory, the efforts should provide a reasonably adequate
defense. Whether conduct is superficial or- cursory, of course, can vary
with the complexity of the claim.101
Judge Bazelon's specific duties were not to be inflexible and iron-
clad."2 Rather, Judge Bazelon recognized that a failure to comply with a
certain duty might be justifiable or excusable under the circumstances. 3
To the same extent, the union's duties should not be absolute, and courts
should permit a union to justify or excuse a failure to comply with a duty.
One circuit has suggested an approach that permits a union to justify or
excuse a failure to act in the interests of an employee.104
'5 See Ethier v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir.), cert, denied,
444 U.S. 826 (1979). See also Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 315 (6th Cir.
1975) (McCree, J., concurring) (perfunctory conduct intentional and superficial).
" See, e.g. Milstead v. Teamsters, Local 157, 580 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1978).
00 See, e.g., Smith v Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1240 (8th Cir. 1980)
(court referred to inadequate investigation into skill of employees as superficial review);
Milstead v. Teamsters, Local 157, 580 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1978) (court described inade-
quate union efforts as inept); Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 486 F. Supp. 966, 970-71 (E.D.
Ark. 1980) (union held liable for handling claim in competently but union did not lack zeal or
good will).
" Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 569 (1976).
" Id. at 568. Some courts make reference to a range of acceptable performance when
discussing the nature of the duty of fair representation, but fail to define the extent of this
range of acceptable performance. See, e.g., Findley v. Jones Motor Frieght, 639 F.2d 953,
958 (3d Cir. 1981); Baldini v. Local U. 1095, 581 F.2d 145, 151 (7th Cir. 1978).
10 See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
10 See, e.g., Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 486 F. Supp. 966, 970-71 (ED. Ark; 1980)
(representative should not have processed complex claim with same efforts as in routine
claim), rev'd on other grounds, 648 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1981).
:02 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
13 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
' Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1211 (6th Cir. 1981) (absent justifica-
tion or excuse, union can be liable for failure to file grievance). See also Christopher v.
Safeway Stores Inc., 644 F.2d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 1981) (union unjustified in not taking
grievance to arbitration); Baldini v. Local Union 1095, International Union, UAW, 581 F.2d
145, 151 (7th Cir. 1978) (if union had no legitimate reason for action, liability could follow);
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A union could justify a failure to act by demonstrating that the
failure was necessary to protect the interests of other employees in the
bargaining unit. 5 To excuse a failure to comply with a specific duty the
union could demonstrate that even a vigorous representative might have
commited the same mistake"' or that a mere error in judgment was the
reason for noncompliance with a specific duty.0 7 For example, courts
have refused to hold a union liable for failing to file a grievance because
the union representative accidentally misnumbered the grievance"8 or
because the representative misunderstood a confusing contractual
description of the filing deadline."0 9 In addition, a union has excused a
failure to file by demonstrating a complete absence of fault since the
representative had relied on an employer's past disregard of untimely
filings. 110 Permitting the union to ,justify or excuse a failure to comply
with a certain duty ensures that the specific duties do not become rigid
and unresponsive to unique factual circumstances or to the fallibility of
even vigorous union representatives.
Many courts have employed a distinction between simple negligence
Griffin v. International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1972) (union could not
justify failure to attempt settlement with objective plant supervisor); Dutrisac v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 511 F. Supp. 719, 724 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (union may justify conduct by show-
ing purpose of furthering legitimate union objectives); Stevens v. Teamsters Local 2707, 504
F. Supp. 332, 336 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (union failed to advance any reason for failure to notify
employee of withdrawal of grievance); Bowe v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 495 F. Supp. 120, 123
(E.D. Mo. 1980) (union justified in not taking grievance to arbitration); Boudreaux v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 485 F. Supp. 347, 350 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (union justified in not processing
grievance); Hershman v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 434 F. Supp. 46, 49-50 (D. Nev. 1977) (union
must have reason for failing to conduct comprehensive investigation).
lI See Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 511 F. Supp. 719, 724 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (union
may justify conduct by showing purpose of furthering legitimate union objectives); text ac-
companying notes 59-60 supra.
1" See Coe v. United Rubber Cork Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 571 F.2d 1349, 1351
(5th Cir. 1978). The court in Coe, citing Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
301 (1971), emphasized that honest but mistaken conduct should not establish a breach of
the duty of fair representation. Id. In Coe, the union representative caused a grievance to
be untimely filed by misnumbering the grievance by one number. Id. at 1350-51. The court
indicated that the failure was merely an understandable error. Id.
1" See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976) (breach of
duty of fair representation involves more than mere errors in judgment); Russom v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 558 F.2d 434, 439, 442 (8th Cir.) (errors in judgment insufficient to establish
breach), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 955 (1977); Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524
F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1974) (poor judgment will not establish breach); Whitten v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d 1335, 1341 (6th Cir. 1975) (poor judgment not breach of duty),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 981 (1976); Steed v. United Parcel Serv., 512 F. Supp. 1088, 1092 (S.D.
W.Va. 1981) (mistakes and errors in strategy did not indicate an unfair effort on part of
union).
10. See note 106 supra.
10 See Ethier v. U.S. Postal Service, 590 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 1979).
o'0 Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1210, 1212 (6th Cir. 1981) (union
relied on employer's past practice of liberal extensions for grievance deadline; union not at
fault for employer's refusal to honor untimely filed grievance).
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and gross negligence to define conduct that is excusable."' Courts state
that a union will be liable only for gross negligence."' Courts, however,
have not articulated the difference between simple and gross negli-
gence,"' and by conclusorily asserting, without analysis, that certain con-
duct is only simple negligence and not gross negligence, courts give the
appearance of applying the terminology to reach a predetermined result.
Courts may really examine not so much the severity of the breach of duty
as the severity of prejudice, resulting from the breach, to the fairness of
the employee's hearing."' If courts base a decision as to whether conduct
"I See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1210, 1212 (6th Cir. 1981) (ordi-
nary negligence is not breach of duty); Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 961 (3d
Cir. 1981) (mere negligence is not breach of duty); Stephens v. Postmaster General, 623 F.2d
594, 596 (9th Cir. 1980) (negligence is not a breach of duty); Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean
Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891 (4th Cir. 1980) (negligence not a breach of duty); Robesky v.
Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1978) (reckless disregard of
rights is breach of duty); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970)
(negligence is not a breach of duty). The holding that negligence is not a breach of duty
seems to have arisen with Bazarte. See id. The Bazarte court apparently reasoned that
since the word arbitrary does not connote negligence, negligence is not an issue in an unfair
representation case. See id. The Supreme Court has not ratified the use of the distinction
between simple and gross negligence. Not only does the word "perfunctory," used in Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967), suggest the word negligence as a synonym, see THE RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLIGH LANGUAGE 1070 (unabr. ed. 1973), but also in Inter-
national Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), Justice Blackmun, joined
by three other Justices concurring in the majority's prohibition of punitive damages, noted
that the union behavior was no more than negligence and could not support punitive
damages. Id. at 53. If negligence could not support liability at all, the Justice Blackmun
woud not have reached the question of whether negligence can support punitive damages.
See generally, Steinhauer, supra note 1.
I See note 111 supra.
,, See note 111 supra. The lack of a clear difference between the terms "negligence" and
"gross negligence" is illustrated by cases subsequent to Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523
F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975). Ruzicka described a union's failure to file as negligence and imposed
liability. Id. at 310. However, subsequent courts, possibly not wanting to upset the vague
distinction between simple and gross negligence, have referred to the negligence in Ruzicka
as gross negligence. See Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1090 (9th
Cir. 1978); Besedich v. Missile & Space Div. of LTV Aerospace Corp., 433 F. Supp. 954, 959
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Welch v. Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1069, 1075 (E.D. Tenn.
1980).
In 1979, John Irving, then General Counsel of the NLRB, issued a memorandum in
which he proposed to delineate the difference between negligence and gross negligence. See
Memorandum 79-55 of General Counsel John Irving to Regional Directors, Officers in
Charge & Resident Officers (July 9, 1979), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP (BNA), No. 137, July
16, 1979. (citing in Steinhauer, supra note 1, at 1047 n.42). General Counsel Irving, however,
failed to articulate a difference and advised that Regional Directors bring a difficult case to
the General Counsel. See Steinhauer, supra note 1, at 1047 n.42. Attempting to draw
distinctions between degrees of negligence is equally imprecise and unworkable in tort law.
See id. at 1047 n.42, (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THEILAW OF TORTS § 34, at 182 (4th ed.
1971)).
1,4 See, e.g., Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 959 (3d Cir. 1981) (considered
prejudice when determining that negligence was not gross negligence); Dutrisac v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 511 F. Supp. 719, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (failure to file causes so much pre-
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is gross or simple negligence on the amount of prejudice that results
from a breach of duty, then courts are not providing a clear and stable
definition of the scope of the duty. Courts might isolate the issue of pre-
judice to the employee's claim, and base a decision to hear a suit in court
not so much on the severity of the union's breach as on the severity of
prejudice to the reliability and integrity of the grievance procedures.
Rather than employing the vague terms of "simple negligence" and "gross
negligence," courts could describe concretely the minimum level of
satisfactory performance in terms of superficiality and cursoriness, and
then could openly focus on the degree of prejudice to an employee's
defense resulting from a breach of a specific duty.
In the context of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel, a criminal defendant must show prejudice, that is, show
that counsel's dereliction affected the outcome of the trial."' Although
Judge Bazelon argued that requiring a criminal defendant to show the
likelihood of his own acquittal is inconsistent with a criminal defendant's
presumption of innocence,"' Judge Bazelon indicated that counsel's
breach of duty had to be consequential."1 7 Upon a criminal defendant's
showing that counsel's dereliction was substantial, the burden would
then shift to the government to pr6ve beyond a rasonable dout that
counsel's dereliction was harmless error."'
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court did not
expressly state that courts should add a prejudice requirement to an
employee's claim in an unfair representation suit, but the Court used
judice to employee that negligent failure to file is breach of duty of fair representation);
Stevens v. Teamsters Local 27207, 504 F. Supp. 332, 335 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (egregious con-
duct is reckless and prejudicial); Kleban v. Hygrade Food Prod. Corp., 102 L.R.R.M. 2773,
2778 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (negligence can be arbitrary when it prevents grievance procedures
from working and deprives employee of representation). Connally v. Transcon Lines, 583
F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1978) (negligent conduct can be breach if it deprives employee of fair
hearing).
115 See, e.g., Word v. United States, 604 F.2d 1127, 1130 (8th Cir. 1979); Davis v.
Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 446 U.S. 903
(1980); United States v. Ritch, 583 F.2d 1179, 1183 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979);
United States v. Cooper, 580 F.2d 259, 263 n.8 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Williams, 575
F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978); United States ex rel. Green v.
Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Note, A Functional Analysis of the Ef-
fective Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1053, 1061-73 (1980).
"' See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196,291 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., dissent-
ing).
11 See United States v. Decoster (624 F.2d at 338-39), (Decoster H) (a substantial viola-
tion is consequential).
"I See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting). Under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), courts may deem some consti-
tutional errors to be harmless and not requiring reversal of a conviction. Id. at 21-22. The
government, however, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an error was harmless.
Id. at 23-24.
1 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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language suggesting the addition of a prejudice requirement.12 The
Court indicated that if "there is substantial reason to believe that a
union breach of duty contributed to the erroneous outcome,"12 ' or if "the
contractual processes have been seriously flawed" '22 or "tainted,"1 or if
the breach "seriously undermines the integrity of the arbitral process," '124
then courts can overlook the finality of the grievance procedures and
hear an employee's claim in court.12 Since Hines, lower courts increas-
ingly have added an express prejudice requirement to the employee's
claim. '28
A prejudice requirement is a necessary element in an employee's
claim for relief. Only after an employee has shown specifically how a
union breach affected the integrity of the grievance procedures can the
trier of fact determine if a second hearing in court is necessary. The
union breach may be egregious and totally unjustifiable, but if no dif-
ference in the outcome of the grievance procedures would have resulted,
the outcome should remain final. If the finality of the grievance proce-
dures diminishes, employers may become reluctant to finance grievance
procedures that fail to prevent litigation in court.12 Further, grievance
procedures that are seldom final do not promote the rapid resolution of
grievances," which is necessary to reduce tension in labor-management
relations. Requiring the employee to show that a union breach seriously
undermined the integrity of the grievance procedures will further the
policy of finality.
Modeling the test for determining a union's compliace with the duty
of fair representation on Judge Bazelon's analytic framework will isolate
important issues and provide ready guidance to courts and juries. The
vague standard of "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith," on the
'' See text accompanying notes 121-26 infra.
Il Id. at 568.
'2 Id. at 570.
' Id. at 568.
4 Id. at 567.
lId.
12 See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1981) (employee
must show breach seriously undermined integrity of grievance procedure); Findley v. Jones
Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958 (3d Cir. 1981) (did breach taint arbitral decision); Del Casal
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 1981) (breach must seriously undermine
integrity of arbitral process); Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., Inc., 616 F.2d 272, 277 (7th Cir.
1980) (conduct seriously undermined integrity of arbitral process); King v. Space Carriers
Inc., 608 F.2d 283, 289 (8th Cir. 1979) (conduct that seriously flaws contractual procedures
removes bar of finality); Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1277 (7th Cir. 1977)
(finality of arbitral process removed by breach that seriously undermined integrity of arbi-
tral process); Johnson v. AAA Trucking Co., 448 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (breach
must undermine integrity of arbitration process).
11 See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 574 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (undermining finality of grievance procedures will discourage use of procedures).
12 See Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 958 (3d Cir. 1981) (rapid resolution
of grievances is policy of federal labor law).
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other hand, neither isolates important issues nor offers a clear descrip-
tion of the elements of fair representation. Adopting a test based on
Judge Bazelon's analytic framework will not result in disrupting change,
for both the content and structure of the test derive from existing case
law.
JAMES R. MACAYEAL
